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Abstract 
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is a dynamic routing protocol in the Internet that allows Autonomous System 
(AS) to exchange information with other networks. The main goal of BGP is to provide a loop free path to the 
destination. Security has been a major issue for BGP and due to a large number of attacks on routers; it has 
resulted in router misconfiguration, power failure and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Detection and prevention 
of attacks in router at early stages of implementation has been a major research focus in the past few years. In 
this research paper, we compare three statistical based anomaly detection algorithms (CUSUM, adaptive 
threshold and k-mean cluster) through experiment. We then carry out analysis, based on detection probability, 
false alarm rate and capture intensity (high & low) on the attacked routers. 
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Statistical Detection Algorithm, IDS (Intrusion Detection System), Network monitoring, Anomaly Detection. 
INTRODUCTION 
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the de-facto inter-domain routing protocol used across thousands of 
Autonomous Systems (AS) in the Internet. Internet connectivity plays a vital role in business, universities and 
government organisations. Large number of attacks on routers can cause misconfiguration and DoS (Denial of 
Service) attacks (Butler, Farley, McDaniel, & Rexford, 2010; Rick Kuhn 2007; Sengar, Xinyuan, Haining, 
Wijesekera, & Jajodia, 2009). DoS attack is the major security threat to the internet today, among which, is the 
TCP SYN flooding, the most common type of attack. The aim of the DoS attack is to consume large amounts of 
bandwidth (Butler, et al., 2010). Any system connected to the internet and using TCP services are prone to such 
attacks. Recent studies have shown that an increase in such attacks can cause billions of dollars of revenue loss. 
Intrusion detection system (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention system (IPS) are the processes used to detect 
malicious packets and to filter them out from the system. There are several ways to detect and separate malicious 
packets based on traffic patterns and behaviours. For instance signature-based, statistical-based and hybrid based 
(Siris & Papagalou, 2004). In this paper we present and evaluate three anomaly detection algorithms for 
detecting TCP SYN attacks (CUSUM, adaptive threshold and k-mean cluster). Our aim is to find and compare 
detection probability, false alarm rate and capture intensity of attacked packets.  
This paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we present related works. In section 3 we present introduction to 
Network Data Mining (NDM) and provide information on how experimental data is collected, processed and 
evaluated. Section 4 presents various types of BGP attacks and relates them to the algorithms presented in this 
paper. In section 5, we discuss various anomaly detection algorithms. In section 6 we perform experiments to 
check the efficiency and their performance. Section 7 presents the performance analysis and Section 8 presents 
the conclusion and future work. 
RELATED WORKS 
Anomaly detection has received considerable attention from researchers in the past few years. To detect 
anomalies packet, different methods are used by various researchers including signature based, rules based, 
pattern matching and finite state machines. (Ruth M. Mutebi 2010) used a combination of cumulative sum, the 
Source IP Monitoring algorithm (SIM) and the adaptive threshold to detect volume based traffic. CUSUM and 
SIM run parallel to detect attacks and the adaptive threshold algorithm is used to monitor the sources of high 
traffic or if any conflict is generated. 
(Siris & Papagalou, 2004), compared cumulative sum and adaptive threshold algorithm and investigated 
detection probability, detection delay and false alarm rate. (Shaikh, Iqbal, & Samad, 2005), used the same 
algorithm to detect SYN flood attacks. In the case of high and low intensity attacks, CUSUM shows good 
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performance while adaptive threshold algorithm exhibits better performance in detecting high intensity attacks. 
(Cisar & Maravic Cisar, 2007) used Exponentially Weight Moved Average (EWMA) control charts to monitor 
the rate of occurrences of events based on the intensity of attacks by using the adaptive threshold algorithms. 
(Gerhard M¨unz; Li & Wang, 2009) used the same algorithm to calculate anomaly packets in real time by 
distributing profile traffic features and used entropy to differentiate between normal and anomaly packets. 
(Gerhard M¨unz) used Network Data Mining (NDM) techniques to capture the packets and used the K-means 
algorithm on captured training data to separate normal and anomalous packets in clusters. 
Our work is a combination of the above algorithms (CUSUM, adaptive threshold and k-mean cluster) by using 
the Network Data Mining (NDM) method which evaluates detection probability, strengths & weaknesses and 
false alarm rates. Furthermore, these patterns in the database can be used as a signature to capture the incidents 
in the future. 
NETWORK DATA MINING 
Network data mining (NDM) is useful for two different purposes. First, we gain knowledge about different types 
of data which then allows us to identify outlier within the data records that can be considered as malicious or 
suspicious. Secondly, NDM can be deployed to define the set of rules that are typical for specific kinds of traffic, 
for example, normal internet traffic or DoS attack traffic. These rules and patterns can be used as a signature to 
analyse the new set of data and compare them against the original data (Gerhard M¨unz; Huang, 1996). 
Experiment Model 
For our experiment purpose we use the KDD model. Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) is an 
interdisciplinary area focusing upon methodologies for extracting useful patterns from data. Data mining is 
becoming an increasingly important tool in transforming this data into information. This information is further 
used in a wide range of scientific discoveries. Following the KDD model is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
1. Raw data: Data is recorded in the database for a specific interval of time. 
2. Pre-processing: After collecting the raw data it is necessary to perform filtering on the data in order to 
remove unwanted data. 
3. Transformation: At this stage, we apply the algorithm on pre-processed data to transform it into 
meaningful information for example a bar graph. 
4. Evaluation: In this step we compare the outcomes of our algorithm with the original data using patterns 
and then turn them into knowledge. 
 
1. Selection
2. Pre-processing 
3. Transformation 
4. Pattern evaluation 
Knowledge 
Raw Data 
Pre-processed Data 
Transformed Data 
Patterns 
Figure 1: KDD process model. 
206 
 
TYPES OF ATTACK 
BGP carries large amounts of traffic without proper security measures and training the data might be subject to 
an attack. Hence it is necessary to understand the types of attacks and its behaviour (Butler, et al., 2010; Rick 
Kuhn 2007). Following are the types of attacks which BGP routers encounter in a network: 
Origin Attack 
In this type of attack AS (Autonomous System) advertises modified or false information through BGP UPDATE 
message which passes through neighbour router who can claim it from the originator, also known as the prefix 
hijack. 
Path Subversion 
It is a special case of an origin attack in which the attacker modifies the content of the BGP UPDATE message 
(insert or delete) which can cause routing delays or allow false AS to modify the internet traffic, which makes it 
very difficult to detect the origin of such attacks (Butler, et al., 2010; Rick Kuhn 2007). 
Denial of Service 
In the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, an attacker attempts to send a large number of false traffic to routers, 
which causes the router to go offline or create a black hole. Meanwhile, if the neighbour router did not receive 
KEEPALIVE message from the offline router, then it causes route instability or flapping (Butler, et al., 2010; 
Rick Kuhn 2007). 
Misconfiguration 
Configuring BGP router is a complex and an error prone task. During the configuration process, a command line 
error can cause route instability (Ali & Boutaba, 2009; Butler, et al., 2010; Wuzuo WANG, 2010). 
Basically all the attackers share common characteristics of the attack to send a large number of traffic and then 
create instability in the router. Their primary target are the port address, ip address and AS (routing table).Port 
scan (Butler, et al., 2010; Wuzuo WANG, 2010) is one of the most common techniques for attackers to discover 
the services then break into the network. All hosts connected to the network uses TCP and UDP port services. 
Port scan does not make any direct damage but it helps the attackers identify which port is available to launch 
various attacks on. Figure 2(a) exhibits such a case where the source port, scans the destination port and sends a 
large number of traffic to the destination port. 
Denial of service is one of the most common types of attacks in which the attacker attempts to make the network 
resource unavailable for the host (Wuzuo WANG, 2010). Figure 2(b) illustrates one of the most common types of 
attacks which is also known as the “SYN Flood” attack, in which the source host floods the destination host with 
SYN packets which consumes a large bandwidth of data and resources from the network. Denial of service also 
happens incidentally due to poor programming or misconfiguration. 
 
   
 
A malicious route injection involves the transmission of routes to unallocated prefixes. These prefixes are the 
sets of IP addresses which are unassigned. During the BGP update messages, a host router can inject a wrong 
prefix to the destination router which can cause route instability. Figure 2(c) shows that attackers hijack the 
internet traffic path by advertising a false path to destination AS (Butler, et al., 2010; Wuzuo WANG, 2010). 
Figure 2(a) Port attack 
Figure 2(b) IP address attack 
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ANOMALY DETECTION ALGORITHMS 
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is a routing protocol which was designed to route IP packets over large 
networks (Butler, et al., 2010). BGP runs over TCP and is a core routing protocol which requires a valid three-
way handshaking before the host can establish a connection with any neighbouring device, such as router. Port 
scanning is one of the most common techniques used by the attacker to discover the services running on the host 
device. Since BGP messages communicate over the well known TCP port i.e. 179, it is much easier for an 
attacker to flood SYN packets over the network. 
In this section, we present three statistical anomaly detection algorithms that detect SYN flood attacks and also 
provide protection to DoS attacks. The first algorithm is a widely used anomaly detection, based on the change 
point detection theory. The second and third are simple algorithms that detect anomalies based on violation of a 
specific threshold (Ruth M. Mutebi 2010; Shaikh, et al., 2005; Siris & Papagalou, 2004). 
 
5. Cusum (Cumulative Sum) Algorithm 
CUSUM or (cumulative sum) is a simple algorithm to detect the anomaly packets if the numbers of packets or 
traffic exceeds a particular threshold. An alarm is raised to detect an anomaly packet. The formula below is used 
to calculate CUSUM used in the algorithm (Ruth M. Mutebi 2010; Shaikh, et al., 2005; Siris & Papagalou, 
2004). 
 
 
 
Algorithm 
 
1. Calculate  xi =
ሺͳ൅ʹ൅͵൅ǥǤǤ൅ሻ

 
2. Define upper and lower limit of CUSUM threshold. 
3. UPPER _LIMIT max(0,xi-k) + C_UPPPER_LIMIT i-1  
4. LOWER _LIMIT     max (0, xi -k) + C_LOWER_LIMIT i-1  
5. Define threshold level (k) 
6.      For i=1… j do 
7.      CUSUM=xj-xi 
8.                    If (CUSUM < k ) then  
9.                             Sound alarm 
10.                   Else return to step 5 
11.      End. 
 
6. Adaptive Threshold Algorithm 
Figure 2(c) false route injection 
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The adaptive threshold algorithm is relatively simple. Its’ working mechanism is similar to CUSUM. If the 
number of packets increases the threshold level, then an alarm is raised (Butler, et al., 2010; Ruth M. Mutebi 
2010; Shaikh, et al., 2005; Siris & Papagalou, 2004; Wuzuo WANG, 2010). 
This relies on testing whether the traffic measurement, number of SYN packets in our case, over a given interval, 
exceeds a particular threshold. In order to account for seasonal (daily and weekly) variations and trends, the 
value of the threshold is set adaptively based on an estimate of the mean number of SYN packets, which is 
computed from recent traffic measurements. If xn is the number of SYN packets in the nth time interval, and 
μn−1 is the mean rate estimated from measurements prior to n, then the alarm condition is given by: 
                          If  then ALARM signalled at time n  
Where, α > 0 is a parameter, this indicates the percentage above the mean value that we consider to be an 
indication of an anomalous behaviour. The mean µn can be computed over some past time window or by using 
an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) of previous measurements.  
 
Where, Γ is the EWMA factor. Direct application of the above algorithm would yield a high number of false 
alarms (false positives). A simple modification that can improve its performance is to signal an alarm after a 
minimum number of consecutive violations of the threshold. In this case the alarm condition is given by (Butler, 
et al., 2010; Ruth M. Mutebi 2010; Shaikh, et al., 2005; Siris & Papagalou, 2004; Wuzuo WANG, 2010). 
Then, ALARM at time n, where k > 1 is a parameter that indicates the number of consecutive intervals the 
threshold must be violated to sound an alarm. The changeable parameter  of the above algorithm are the  
threshold factor  α for calculating the successive  threshold, the number of successive threshold violations k 
before signalling an alarm, the EWMA factor Γ, and the length of the time interval over which SYN packets are 
diagnosed. 
Algorithm 
 
1.  SELECT the total number of host  sumhost 
2.  SELECT the number of hosts with degree xi numberofhost[i] 
3.  Count rows of different degree numdiffdegree 
4.  for i:= 1 to numberofhost do 
5.          numberof host[i]/sumhost f(xi) 
6.          Compute and normalize the A(x) →yi 
7.  Repeat 1-6 
8.  Rule out yi which beyond the threshold 
9.  avg(y1,y2,…,y60) µ 
10.  avg( ( Y- µ )2 )σ2   Z=yk, k=1,2,… 
11.  setup threshold: m ± 2* σ 
 
7. K-mean Cluster Algorithm 
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K-means clustering is an algorithm which targets to partition n data points of the same values into k clusters [3].  
Data points which are close to centroid, share the same feature value (Ali & Boutaba, 2009; Gerhard M¨unz; Li 
& Wang, 2009; Meng, Shang, & Bian, 2009; Silveira & Diot, 2010). 
Algorithm  
 
1. Define the number of clusters K.  
2. Place the K cluster to its nearest centroids by Euclidean distance. 
3. Recalculate the positions of each K to its nearest centroids. 
4. Repeat step2 and step3 until all the centroids converge. 
 
 
The distance between each similar point is calculated by distance function, Euclidean distance is the most 
common distance function which is defined as: 
                                 
ሺǡ ሻ ൌ ඥσ ሺ െ ሻൌͳ 2 
 
Where x=(x1, x2…xn) and y= (y1, y2….yn) are the two input vector. As we choose initial value K=1 considering 
that normal traffic. The distances from cluster centroids are calculated by the weighted Euclidean distance 
function which is given below. 
ሺǡ ሻ ൌ ටσ ቀ െ ቁ

ൌͳ 2 
 
An object is to be classified as normal if it is close to the normal cluster centroids, otherwise anomalous, if it’s 
far from the normal cluster centroid. Figure 3(a) shows before cluster algorithm is applied where P1, P2 and P3 
are classified as anomaly packet whereas, in figure 3(b) where diameter of centroid is increased so P1 and P3 are 
considered as normal while P2 is anomaly packet(Ali & Boutaba, 2009; Gerhard M¨unz). 
 
 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS 
For the experimental analysis we extracted the dataset from the MIT-Lincoln Labs, KDD CUP 99 which is 
available publicly. The dataset contains a standard set of normal and attacked data which is useful for testing the 
algorithm performance. Our performance evaluation is based on three major experiments. In the first experiment 
scenario, the attacker sends illegitimate traffic (high intensity attack packets) which can cause a buffer overflow 
or a black-hole process. In the second scenario, we reduced the amplitude of our traffic by 50% to check the 
Figure 3(b) After clustering Figure 3(a) Before clustering 
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efficiency of an algorithm at low intensity of attacks. In the last scenario we evaluate our experiment data on 
Receiver Operate Curve (ROC) which shows the trade-off between detection probability and false alarm rate.  
A. High intensity Attacks 
In first experimental scenario we considered high intensity of attacks where attacker sends large number of SYN 
packets which eventually can causes buffer overflow or denial of service (Gerhard M¨unz; Shaikh, et al., 2005; 
Siris & Papagalou, 2004). 
 
 
 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Figure 4(a) CUSUM                             Figure 4(b) Adaptive threshold 
 
       
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) shows the results for the CUSUM, adaptive threshold and k-mean cluster, respectively. 
The horizontal axis in these figures represents time interval seconds started from 0 to 10000 while vertical axis 
shows the number of packets. The above graphs show that all of our algorithms exhibit excellent performance 
and high intensity attacks detection probability of a 100% and 0% alarm rate ratio. 
B. Low Intensity Attacks 
In second scenario we reduced the amplitude of the attack by 50% of the actual mean rate to check the 
performance of our algorithm for low intensity attacks. Detection of low intensity attacks is important for two 
reasons: Firstly, it enables protection to take action at an earlier stage. Secondly, the attacker can be easily 
tracked because it’s closer to the source (Gerhard M¨unz; Siris & Papagalou, 2004). Placement of such detection 
algorithms can help us to identify the hosts which are participating in denial of service attacks. 
 
Figure 4(c) K mean 
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           Figure 5(a) CUSUM                            Figure 5(b) Adaptive threshold 
 
 
                Figure 5(c) K mean 
  
Figure 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) illustrates the performance of CUSUM, adaptive threshold and the k-mean cluster 
algorithms respectively for low intensity attacks. Figure 5(a) shows that the performance of the CUSUM 
algorithm which is much better in detecting the low intensity of attacks. On the other hand, figure 5(b) & 5(c) 
shows that the deteriorated performance of the adaptive threshold and k-mean cluster algorithms are used for 
detecting low intensity of attacks. 
C. False Alarm & Detection Probability 
To validate the efficiency of the above algorithms, we tested high and low intensity of attacks on the Receiver 
Operate Curve (ROC). On the horizontal axis we labelled the detection probability which is the percentage of 
attacks while alarms were raised and on the vertical axis, we labelled the false alarm rate (FAR) (Siris & 
Papagalou, 2004), which is the probability of the false detection that did not correspond to the actual attack. We 
calculated high and low intensity attacks on the ROC graph for the first five intervals for each algorithm. Figure 
6(a) & 6(b), illustrates that the CUSUM algorithm demonstrates good performance on both low and high 
intensity attacks with 100% detection rate and a false alarm rate of 0%. 
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Figure 6(a): CUSUM high intensity       Figure 6(b) CUSUM low intensity 
 
               
       
           Figure 7(a) Adaptive threshold high intensity   Figure 7(b) Adaptive threshold low intensity 
  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 (a,b) & 8 (a,b) shows that in both the algorithms, the adaptive threshold and k mean cluster have better 
performance in the case of high intensity attacks with better detection probability (Cisar & Maravic Cisar, 2007; 
Shaikh, et al., 2005; Siris & Papagalou, 2004). On the other hand, for low intensity, both algorithms show the 
worst performance with high alarm rate.  
  
Figure 8(a) K mean high intensity     
attack. 
Figure 8(b) K mean low intensity 
attack 
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 PERFORMANCE ANALYSES 
 
According to the data analysis above, we can see that the adaptive threshold and k-mean cluster have fast 
detection probability in capturing high intensity of attacked packets while cusum detects but with slow 
performance. On the other hand, cusum detects low intensity attack packets while the other two algorithms show 
poor performance in capturing low intensity attacks. 
The experimental results show that the cusum algorithm has better performance in capturing anomaly in low 
traffic network while the adaptive threshold and the k-cluster is good for high traffic networks. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we presented three statistical algorithms which detected SYN flooding attacks namely CUSUM, 
adaptive threshold and k-mean cluster for detecting anomaly packets in real time. The algorithms were 
implemented and their performances were tested using KDD CUP 99 dataset. Our investigations considered 
different parameters i.e. detection rate, false alarm rate, and intensity of attacks.  
Based on the above experiments, the CUSUM algorithm has better performance in capturing high and low 
intensity attacks with high detection probability and low false alarm rate .On the other hand, the adaptive 
threshold and k-mean cluster showed better performance in capturing high intensity anomaly packets while in 
the case of low intensity attacks its performance deteriorated with high alarm rate. 
Our ongoing research primarily focuses on traffic anomalous features of inbound and outbound traffic of 
production networks and it also provides us with a defensive mechanism at an earlier stage of the attacks which 
causes a denial of service. 
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